Our own writing on AI security. What our red team actually finds in production systems, what the new standards and advisories really require, and where agentic risk is going next. Researched and written in-house, not aggregated from anywhere.
OpenAI agents bypassed a read-only restriction on a dormant German wiki using GET-based writes and an unvalidated Azure Blob Storage hostname allowlist. What that incident, and OWASP's 2026 Excessive Agency ranking, mean for the egress controls on your own agents.
Read the post →Model evaluation is not HIPAA due diligence. Why every healthcare AI vendor needs a signed BAA and monitored data flow, and how the PHI Egress Scan gives compliance teams a fast, honest first read on what is actually going to each vendor.
Read the post →Confirmed CVEs, an NSA advisory, and a real supply-chain attack. What actually happened to the Model Context Protocol this year, and what to do about the MCP servers already running in your environment.
Read the post →More posts as we publish them. Everything above is written here. If you want the industry's own reporting instead of ours, our free Threat Intel feed aggregates it daily from CISA, NIST, OWASP GenAI and the security press, and links every item back to the outlet that published it.
Original writing on AI security from the people building the platform: agentic risk, red-team findings, and the advisories worth reading in full. A few times a month at most, no sales sequence, and one click to leave.
RedLens red-teams the AI systems you've already shipped, then shows you exactly how to close what it finds.